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If It Walks Like a Duck… Classifying Berkshire Hathaway

March 4th, 2010

Berkshire Hathaway’s sector classification suddenly became important to many investors after BRK.B (Berkshire’s B Share Class) was added to the S&P 500 on February 12, 2010. Because BRK.B was classified as a Financial, XLF, the most popular Financial Sector ETF, now has a significant weight in BRK.B. Other popular financial sector ETFs, like VFH, have smaller, though still significant, allocations to BRK.B. Since these ETFs are liquid, inexpensive and relatively precise, they’re widely used to make and hedge financial sector bets. However, if a large holding in a Financial Sector ETF doesn’t behave like other Financials, the ETF risks losing considerable precision.

The question many investors are now asking is: Does BRK.B actually belong in the Financial sector? If BRK.B behaves like a Financial, for all practical purposes (including portfolio construction and risk management) it should be treated as a Financial. However, our analysis of BRK.B’s historical returns shows it behaves more like a Consumer Staple stock than a Financial.

BRK.B’s sector classification is of particular importance to both long-only and long-short portfolio managers attempting to manage sector exposure. For example, consider a long-short portfolio manager attempting to construct a sector neutral portfolio. If the portfolio manager is long BRK.B and it behaves like a Consumer Staple and not a Financial, this portfolio will have unintended, potentially large sector tilts towards Consumer Staples and away from Financials.

Based on monthly return correlations, it appears that, in recent years, BRK.B behaves more like a Consumer Staple than a Financial.

brk_corr

As the chart below clearly shows, not only are BRK.B’s returns more closely correlated with Consumer Staples, but the magnitudes of its returns are more similar to Consumer Staples than Financials.

brk_perf

The results from this simple correlation analysis were further supported by more rigorous, quantitative analysis done using MPI’s proprietary Dynamic Style Analysis (DSA) model. When using a multi-factor model comprising of the S&P 500 sectors, Consumer Staples is the dominating factor driving BRK.B’s returns. Since 2001, the exposure of BRK.B’s returns to Consumer Staples is much larger than its exposure to Industrials and Financials combined.

brk_dsa

Why does the market treat BRK.B as a Consumer Staple instead of a Financial when, according to Berkshire itself, their primary business is in the insurance and reinsurance sector? We posit that three different considerations, when viewed together, provide a plausible explanation. First, a large chunk of Berkshire’s insurance businesses are viewed as Consumer Staples not Financials. Second, Berkshire’s reinsurance businesses impact BRK.B’s idiosyncratic returns, but do not have a significant impact on its systematic returns. Finally, and most obviously, Berkshire has large public holdings in companies like Coca-Cola and P&G.

Interestingly, looking at the exposure chart above, prior to 2001, BRK.B traded more like a Financial than a Consumer Staple. What explains this apparent shift in how the market perceives Berkshire Hathaway? We will continue our investigation into BRK.B and Berkshire Hathaway in future blog posts.


Kushal Kshirsagar Main, Research

Hedge Fund Indices Projection (January 2010)

February 10th, 2010

I. Performance Projections - January 2010

The following analysis provides return projections for several hedge fund equity indices for January 2010. By conducting this analysis on a monthly basis, we are essentially creating a synthetic track record for hedge fund index replication. Compared to general back-testing procedures that use historical data, our approach projects the monthly performance before the actual returns are available. Hence, we cannot modify the data to generate more desirable results. Thus, it may be viewed as a “true” projection.

Based on our analysis, most hedge fund strategies will enter the New Year with a loss in January. According to Table 1, nearly all strategies will post a negative return (more than 1%) with long/short equity and emerging market finishing in last place.

 

Table 1: Hedge Fund Indices Performance Projection - January 2010
Database Composite Index Long/Short Equity Emerging Market Event Driven Market Neutral Convertible Arbitrage
Barclays

-2.31

-1.79

-1.81

-1.42

-0.57

-1.58

CS/Tremont

-1.92

-3.07

-2.20

-1.23

-0.47

-1.37

HFRI

-1.74

-2.38

-2.03

-2.15

-1.32

-2.40

Read more…

Daniel Li Main, Monthly Hedge Fund Return Projections

Galleon Technology Fund: A Clipper Or A Barge?

November 17th, 2009

The goal of this week’s post is to explore the factors driving Galleon Technology fund’s performance a bit deeper. The fund was widely known for its high turnover, rapid-fire trading and extensive use of options to leverage short-term bets. Therefore, it seems unlikely that this quintessential hedge fund could resemble a typical technology sector mutual fund. But, as we’ve already learned from our previous analysis of Renaissance RIEF, such massive trading may inadvertently result in performance that can be explained by a handful of directional bets.

First, we expanded the time period from our previous post. The chart below now includes excess return information for five full years from 2004 where we’ve highlighted three months: July ’07 and ’08, which have come under heavy scrutiny for alleged insider trading and July ’06, where outperformance was notably higher than both July ’07 and July’08. Over the five year period (2004-2008) these three months were the only months when the Galleon fund significantly outperformed its peers—an average technology hedge fund in the index.

galleon2_excess1

Clearly, July performance numbers for each of the three years are deemed as statistical outliers (regardless of the legal connotation) which potentially could distort any further analysis of Galleon returns. In addition, the complaint mentions July 2007 $4M gain from trading Hilton—not a technology stock—which could also “contaminate” our analysis. Given the facts above we decided to remove all three July observaions as outliers.

Next, we proceed with a dynamic forensic analysis of the Galleon Technology fund’s returns similar to the one performed in our previous post using MPI Stylus™ and its DSA engine. The results of this analysis are presented in an exposure chart below. Note that this chart does not show actual holdings, but allocations to different factors that best explain the returns of the fund.

galleon2_dsa

We note quite stable long exposure to several Dow Jones technology sectors. The exposure to foreign technology companies is represented by the MSCI All Country ex. US Tech index, indicating positions in ADRs, foreign stocks, or simply sensitivity to foreign markets through investing in U.S. stocks. Short exposure to PowerShares QQQ ETF is supported by the fund’s SEC filings according to which the fund maintained at times a significant position in QQQ put options. Both the cash exposure (about 60%, an indication of net 40% market exposure) and the size of the short position (30-40%) are similar to our earlier results. At the same time, these results are slightly different from the ones in the previous post, which is expected given that we removed three very large outliers.

It should be noted that because of the removal of outliers the statistical quality of the analysis improved significantly. The R-squared statistic determining the quality of fit is 89% and the Predicted R-squared, MPI’s proprietary cross-validation statistic, is 79%. Such a high quality regression is more typical for a large, diversified mutual fund. The quality of fit is also illustrated in the performance chart below where an exposure-weighted portfolio made of factor indexes (called a “Style” or “Tracking” portfolio) closely tracks the fund’s actual performance in-sample (“Total”).

galleon2_cumul

Note that the tracking is exceptionally good through the middle of 2006 where the fund and the tracking portfolio lines begin to deviate slightly despite the removal of outliers. Nevertheless, both the pattern of performance and its magnitude are captured very well throughout the entire five-year history.

While the results of this analysis are very intriguing and somewhat unexpected, the study itself carries very important lessons for investors. First, it shows that analysis of hedge fund returns is a delicate, iterative process requiring careful examination of residuals. If outliers cannot be explained by any available portfolio information they could warrant removal or winzorisation. More importantly, removal of several large “alpha” outliers allowed us to show that in the remaining periods this quintessential high-turnover arbitrageur behaved more like a diversified mutual fund, with returns mimicked by a few long-term directional bets. And while massive computer-generated trading of Renaissance RIEF resulted in such an immediately apparent pattern, in the case of Galleon, the long-term directional pattern became visible only after identification and removal of several exceptional returns.

Daniel Li, PhD contributed to this research.

Michael Markov Hedge Funds, Main

Galleon Puzzle: Can You Spot Insider Trading - Without Wiretapping?

November 3rd, 2009

The pattern in alpha is as important as its magnitude…

Daniel Li
Michael Markov

In the recent insider trading scandal involving the founder of Galleon Group, Raj Rajaratnam, the government used wiretaps to secretly record his phone conversations and those of his alleged accomplices. In the complaint, government prosecutors present an insider trading case against Rajaratnam and several other executives for illegally profiting from trading stocks and options of Hilton, Google, Akamai and others.

Read more…

Michael Markov Hedge Funds, Main

Is it “Miller Time” or the Market?

October 26th, 2009

Bill Miller is on the front page again, but this time it is good news. The famed manager was featured in a recent cover story by Barron’s titled “It’s Miller Time”.

Read more…

Daniel Li Main, Mutual Funds

Intrepid Small Cap Success: Stock Selection or Market Timing?

October 9th, 2009

The Intrepid Small Cap Fund, managed by Eric Cinnamond of Intrepid Capital Funds, has garnered noteworthy media attention this year. Bloomberg Online’s June 3, 2009 article featured Cinnamond’s fund as the only diversified stock manager to outperform Bill Gross’ venerable Pimco Total Return Bond fund over the trailing 3-year period (through 5/26/09):
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ayC.BwlNdpFU.

Wall Street Journal’s print edition on October 5, 2009 also featured Mr. Cinnamond as placing second in the Winner’s Circle contest for the 12-month period through September 2009 (posting a 29% return).

We decided to take a closer look using daily data and returns-based style analysis (RBSA), and found Mr. Cinnamond’s selection skills over the past eighteen months have been strikingly strong relative to other small capitalization mutual funds.

Read more…

Rahul Rauniyar, CFA Main, Mutual Funds

To Hedge or Not To Hedge?

September 23rd, 2009

We are getting mixed signals from the industry this week. First, on Monday P&I reported that CalPERS decided to discontinue their equity hedging overlay program which caused the plan to lose almost $1B in a year.
http://www.pionline.com/article/20090921/PRINTSUB/309219966/1031/TOC

The message here is that hedging proved to be a tricky business even for CalPERS.

Read more…

Michael Markov Main, Mutual Funds

Fairholme Fund Revisited

August 25th, 2009

We continue to follow Fairholme Fund after posting a detailed attribution analysis of the fund on our blog early in the year. Read more…

Michael Markov Main, Mutual Funds

Identifying Bond Fund Risks Before Getting Burned

June 23rd, 2009

The class action lawsuit involving the Oppenheimer Core Bond Fund (OPIGX) alleges that the firm understated the fund’s risks as reported in a Read more…

Michael Markov Main, Mutual Funds, Research

Renaissance RIEF April ’09 Performance Puzzle

May 15th, 2009

Back in 2007, we published a research report The Law of Large Numbers with an analysis of the Renaissance Technologies RIEF fund and showed how a similar strategy would have performed during previous recessions and major market downturns. Thus, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that the RIEF has lost about 17% through April and 8-9% in April alone as it was reported by The Wall Street Journal and various blogs. Read more…

Michael Markov Hedge Funds, Main, Research