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Archive for the ‘Hedge Funds’ Category

The Past of the Futures (Renaissance RIFF) Fund

March 25th, 2010

While the RIEF fund has opened up a bit to investors, there’s virtually no information available on the Renaissance Futures RIFF fund started in 2007. In his Nov. 2008, testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Jim Simons said about RIFF that it:

“…is a slow trading fund, investing in commodities, currencies, bonds, and stock indices, and is designed to deliver an attractive return at relatively low volatility. …RIFF, started 13 months ago, did well during its first nine months but has been challenged by the turbulence of this fall, during which its returns were disappointing“.

There’s also generic information available at www.wsj.com obtained by WSJ from RIFF marketing materials:

“RIFF is a modestly-leveraged, slow-trading, global futures fund designed to provide substantial risk-adjusted returns, uncorrelated to US and global equity markets and with medium to low correlation to other asset classes… Targets holding times between nine and 12 months… The RIFF system is completely automated, with the exception of part of actual trade execution. Proprietary algorithms evaluate investment opportunities regularly in an effort to improve the portfolio“.

All of the above makes a good case for a dynamic factor analysis of RIFF returns.

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Galleon Technology Fund: A Clipper Or A Barge?

November 17th, 2009

The goal of this week’s post is to explore the factors driving Galleon Technology fund’s performance a bit deeper. The fund was widely known for its high turnover, rapid-fire trading and extensive use of options to leverage short-term bets. Therefore, it seems unlikely that this quintessential hedge fund could resemble a typical technology sector mutual fund. But, as we’ve already learned from our previous analysis of Renaissance RIEF, such massive trading may inadvertently result in performance that can be explained by a handful of directional bets.

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Galleon Puzzle: Can You Spot Insider Trading – Without Wiretapping?

November 3rd, 2009

The pattern in alpha is as important as its magnitude…

Daniel Li
Michael Markov

In the recent insider trading scandal involving the founder of Galleon Group, Raj Rajaratnam, the government used wiretaps to secretly record his phone conversations and those of his alleged accomplices. In the complaint, government prosecutors present an insider trading case against Rajaratnam and several other executives for illegally profiting from trading stocks and options of Hilton, Google, Akamai and others.

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Renaissance RIEF April ’09 Performance Puzzle

May 15th, 2009

Back in 2007, we published a research report The Law of Large Numbers with an analysis of the Renaissance Technologies RIEF fund and showed how a similar strategy would have performed during previous recessions and major market downturns. Thus, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that the RIEF has lost about 17% through April and 8-9% in April alone as it was reported by The Wall Street Journal and various blogs. Read more…

Michael Markov Hedge Funds, Main, Research , , , , ,

Radar for future Madoffs

April 6th, 2009

Pensions & Investments continues to focus on the issue of increased due diligence and transparency in light of the Madoff affair. Read MPI’s opinion piece, “The similarities between Pearl Harbor and Bernie Madoff” which is featured in this week’s P&I Views section. The article provides an interesting link between algorithms used in modern radars and advanced returns-based hedge fund analysis tools.

Michael Markov Hedge Funds

Back of the Book Value

March 27th, 2009

I thought the chart below may be of interest. We compared performance results of Stanford’s investors taken from the SEC complaint1 with one of the largest stable value funds (name withheld). Stanford results in the complaint go only through 2006 and that’s why the line stops there while the stable value fund continues its upward trend through 2008.

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  1. Please see my previous blog post []

Michael Markov Hedge Funds, Main, Research

SEC vs. Stanford: same return for two years – a red flag?

February 21st, 2009

On February 17th, 2009 the SEC charged Stanford International Bank (SIB), R. Allen Stanford, et al with “a massive ongoing fraud.” Below are comments regarding potential challenges to SEC’s rationale and approach in supporting their case presented in the complaint on SEC website.

As shown in the excerpt below, the SEC points to SIB’s absolute performance vs. market indexes:

sec3_cropped1

“Double-digit returns… over the past 15 years” which refers to the chart in Par. 28 of the complaint. Note that these are gross returns, while net returns paid to investors were about 8%. Many hedge funds generated higher after fees returns in 1992-2006. Plus, Stanford returns were high three and five years ago, so there must be something else.

Very suspicious performance in 2008: the fund lost “only” 1.3%. Guess what? So did a quarter of all hedge funds. According to the latest HFR data, 1318 hedge funds out of 5313 reporting lost less than Stanford in 2008. And so did about 12% of mutual funds (excluding money market).

Par. 4 of the complaint states that for SIB producing the same returns of 15.71% for two consecutive years 1995 and 1996 was “impossible” to achieve if Stanford have managed a “global diversified” portfolio of investments. Here’s the exact quote from the complaint:

sec4cropped1

So when did identical returns for two consecutive years become a red flag? This seems more a sign of transparent reporting. If someone were to concoct a fraud, the first thing they would do is to change at least one decimal to make it less suspicious! And by the way, what should be considered a red flag–is 1bp difference sufficient? How about 5bp difference?

First we should note that it is statistically “probable” and “possible” to obtain the same investment return for two consecutive years even when one is invested in liquid market instruments. Highly diversified portfolios would increase the probability. Diversification reduces volatility overall and aggregating volatile data into annual returns further reduces volatility. In addition, if underlying assets have similar performance during these years it increases the likelihood of the portfolio achieving similar results.

We ran a quick test and found about two dozen mutual funds and hedge funds having 1995 and 1996 returns within 10bp range. Note that these are only survivors and the number of actual funds that existed at that time could be easily 2-3 times higher. There are some identical matches in consecutive year performance and for many funds 1995-96 results are within 2-3 bp range.

So is it really a red flag? Well, not by itself based on the above considerations. Whether these numbers represent real returns and are not made up requires more sophisticated analysis such as returns-based (RBSA) and other quantitative due diligence methods.

Michael Markov Hedge Funds, Main